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PANEL II: DISCUSSION TRANSCRIPT

JONATHAN WEINBERG: Most of what I'm going to say
right now is more nearly relevant to Professor Frankel's paper
than to Professor Geist's. And in part that's because Michael's
paper is wonderful and I agree with just about everything in it
so I don't have that much to say about it that's interesting.
I do want to mention, so long as we're talking about it, that a
case like bodacioustatas.com is even worse than Michael may
have suggested, because as he knows, confusion isn't supposed
to be the touchpoint of a UDRP decision. UDRP panelists are
supposed to leave names and places untouched, even if consumers would be confused, unless the domain name registrant
is an evil, bad-faithed cybersquatter. That's when the transfer
is supposed to take place. And the panels in bodacioustatas.com transferred the name after accepting complainant's
argument that no one could possibly have wanted to have a
domain name named bodacioustatas.com except as a means of
tricking people who were looking for Tata & Sons. So there you
have it.
I'm going to talk now about ICANN's power though. And it's
sort of impossible to resist the temptation to do that, given that
less than a week ago, as Professor Frankel mentioned, we got
this extraordinary document bursting on the scene from Stuart
Lynn, ICANN's CEO, in which he stated that the existing
model for ICANN is "simply not workable" and that the organization in its current form cannot accomplish its assigned mission, that absent radical structural change

. . .

"ICANN's le-

gitimate future prospects are non-existent."
I actually have a rather different view of ICANN than Professor Frankel does, but rather than talk about that directly, I
want to focus on these recent developments, because Stuart
Lynn's complaint is threefold. First of all, too many entities
are declining to subject themselves to ICANN authority. Almost none of the ccTLD registries have been willing to sign
contracts in which they promise to follow ICANN policy dictates, promise to pay ICANN money and agree that they can be
divested of their demands at the behest of national governments. The Vert Server operators have declined to site agree-
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ments in which they agree to follow ICANN policies. The address registries have been similarly reluctant. They're balking
at paying ICANN the money ICANN wants. And national governments have so far been unwilling to pressure their ccTLD
registries to force them to sign ICANN contracts. That's the
first problem he identifies.
The second problem he points to, or at least this is the recitation in the Lynn paper, is that ICANN doesn't have enough
money and it's been unsuccessful at convincing DNS shareholders to give it more money. The ccTLDs, for the most part,
are declining to pay. They're taking the bills ICANN is sending
them and using them as useful parakeet cage liners. The address registries are taking money that ICANN is asking them
for and putting them in escrow. There is no mechanism for
national governments to give ICANN money, and they haven't
done it.
So just about all of ICANN's operating budget is coming from
contracts, mandated by contract. It's not. It's coming from
payments, mandated by contract from the gTLD registers and
registrars, and, says Dr. Lynn, that's enough. ICANN needs at
least ten to twelve more full-time staff members on top of the
fifteen to seventeen it has now. It needs to build reserves. It
can't do its job on current funding levels.
Finally, third problem, says Stuart Lynn: "ICANN's being
required to pay much too much attention to building and maintaining structural mechanisms in the interest of representation
and accountability." The idea that ICANN should have board
members selected in actual membership elections, he says, is
fundamentally flawed. Indeed, requirements that ICANN request reconsideration of its action or establish a review panel
for cases where it's accused of violating its own bylaws, are basically just wastes of institutional resources. The most fundamental point in the Lynn paper is that he was misguided to
think that ICANN should be, at its root, consensus-based. He
says that the ICANN board needs to have plenary power to
make decisions even in the absence of consensus to the extent
that they see it necessary to carry out the ICANN mission. He
says that as a purely private entity, ICANN should depend on
the consent of those subjects who its policy controls ...because
regulators should be asked to depend on the regulated for funding. Therefore, he says, it's time to dispense with the notion of
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ICANN as a purely private consensus-based entity. Rather, it
should be reconfigured as a public/private partnership with
one-third of its board appointed by governments with substantial government funding. Everyone who participates in the
ICANN policy process should be paying for the privilege. The
two-thirds of the board not selected by governments will be
self-perpetuating, with members chosen by committees or subsidiary organizations that were itself wholly or partly, chosen
by the ICANN board itself. The board, with contracts in place
and funding assured, should be free to make policy unhampered by concerns of accountability except perhaps to participate in government through a process.
Whether you agree with all this or not, it's an extraordinary
document. It's extraordinary both because one doesn't often
see a CEO explaining that his organization's structure and basic premises are unworkable and because the doctrine goes so
far to jettison the widely agreed on understanding about the
nature of ICANN on which the organization was based.
ICANN's ruling mythology, honored in the breach.., up until
now is that it's merely a consensus-based coordinator. Lynn is
abandoning that to suggest that ICANN really is a regulator
and thus, can't function without explicit government support
and participation.
So, how did we get here? To understand that, you have to
understand the nature of ICANN's power: ICANN's power lies
in its control, subject to the acquiescence of the U.S. government. That control in turn derives from three factors: Number
one, the U.S. government has taken the position that, subject
to its own rubber stamp approval, ICANN can prescribe the
contents of the root zone file of a computer in Herndon, Virginia, known as the "Authoritative A Roots;" number two, the
operators of the other dozen computers making up the authoritative roots will duplicate the contents of that ICANNcontrolled A root zone in their own machines. About half of
those computers are operated by the U.S. government or by
U.S. government contractors, and thus will follow official U.S.
policy of support for ICANN. The others are motivated by a
deep commitment not to "break the root zone," that is, to maintain a single set of authoritative machines serving up a single
and consistent root zone file. Number three, major shareholders in ISPs are also motivated by a desire not to break the roots
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and continue to set their DNS resolvers to direct queries to the
authoritative roots, and they for the most part declined to support any competing set of servers.
Now, all three of these factors are at least somewhat contingent. These promises are subject to being withdrawn in the
extreme scenario of ICANN drastically losing broad-based supports. But it's these three factors that will allow us to say
ICANN controls the roots, and it's that control that's the source
of its power. To be more specific: Exactly what authority does
power over the root give ICANN, and what power does it withhold? Something we've seen quite dramatically is that this arrangement gives ICANN a great deal of really extensive regulatory power over new gTLDs seeking to enter the ICANN control roots. If you download the registry contract for ".biz," between the registry and ICANN, you'll see it's two inches thick.
It's micromanaging in the extreme, and that should not be surprising. ICANN's got essentially plenary control over whether
a new registry enters the roots, therefore, over the conditions
over which that entry takes place.
ICANN's also got extensive regulatory power over the gTLD
registrars since only ICANN can force the registries to give a
registrar access, and they can condition that status for registrar compliance with its regulatory policies. And finally, with
the benefit of really humongous pressure by the U.S. government, it has managed to negotiate a set of contracts with NSI
VeriSign under which the data company agreed to subject itself
to ICANN policy in return for the maintenance of a market arrangement in which VeriSign just makes scads and scads and
scads of money.
All that said, there are other respects in which this arrangement doesn't give ICANN power. Most importantly, it does not
give ICANN much power over the ccTLDs because ICANN's
theoretical ability to control its ccTLD registry from the roots
or to redelegate a country code to another register is seriously
constrained by political factors.
There was one recent case, that of ".au," Australia, in which
ICANN did redelegate a country code without the complete
cooperation of the incumbent. But the reality is that a move
like that, especially if done wholesale, would be unacceptable to
ICANN's constituencies. Given that fact, it's really tremendously hard for ICANN to get the country codes to agree to
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swear fealty and pay taxes, because ICANN doesn't really have
a lot in the way of carrots and sticks for them.
That is the source of the frustration in the Lynn document:
That more governments haven't been pressuring their own
country codes to fall into line. And more generally, ICANN's
control of the root zone turns out to give it rather little authority over any actor other than NSI that was in place for form
and functions before Fall 1998, and therefore doesn't owe
ICANN its place in the DNS structure. I'm not convinced that
it's especially helpful to think of all this in terms of competition
and policy formation, enforcement market and contestable
markets in particular. The relevant market is the one for provision of root server control services. That's a structural role
that conveys regulatory power. And the theory would tell us
that ICANN's power will be constrained if it's relatively easy
for others to provide those services. That is, to set up an alternative root that major players would actually point to.
In fact, there are huge entry barriers to anyone else entering
that market, and so what we learn is that competition in that
market for power doesn't significantly constrain ICANN. It is
the case, as with the so-called domain tax, that various government and industry players compete with each other to influence ICANN, but ICANN is not a participant in that market,
so I'm not sure that the "theory of contestable markets" provides the right analogy. ICANN is constrained, at least for the
moment, but what constrains it is the homely fact that other
players can affect whether it gets the things it wants, so it's got
to be at least a little nice to them.
Stuart Lynn's recent proposal is designed to eliminate those
constraints. ICANN would no longer have to rely on broadbased support to secure its funding if it can get the bulk of its
funding directly from national governments. It would be able
to assert more control over the country codes if national governments committed to pressuring country codes aggressively
within their jurisdictions to submit to ICANN authority. It
wouldn't be restrained by structural procedural requirements
within its own bylaws if those requirements were gone.
So the new vision ... is of an entity with a self-perpetuating
organizational structure that relies for its authority not on
broad-based consensus that it's performing its jobs in an appropriately limited manner, but rather on the funding and ac-
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quiescence of participating national governments. My own
view is that the change would be disastrous from the perspective of accountability and mission creep, not that I'm so thrilled
with what we've got now, but this would be worse. Nonetheless, everything I hear is that ICANN is ready to implement
this plan and that the U.S. and other governments are on
board, so I guess we'll see.
EDWARD JANGER: Thank you. In the interest of leaving
Professor Zittrain some time to speak, I will say he needs no
introduction.
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN: Thanks very much. I'm aware we
have seventeen minutes left, so I'll make the most of it.
We have an amazing panel gathered here. These are people
who not only have studied this area intensely but were sort of
there at the initial constitutional conventions that founded this
thing called ICANN, and I'm eager to engage the panel on discussing some of the stuff that's just happened. Before I do that,
I need to find out something about our audience. And to find
this out, I'm just going to ask a question ... I'm going to ask
you to hum if you can answer the question affirmatively. Do
you know what a ccTLD registry is? [Low murmur]. Notice
that I didn't count to three. All right, so there's probably no
consensus in the room that knows what a ccTLD registry is. A
substantial portion of people, but maybe not a consensus. In
fact, just to test this, hum if you don't know what a ccTLD registry is. All right. Well ... yes, we should actually ask you to
hum if you don't want to admit it.
Now, what just happened was the way things used to run.
You would have a bunch of engineers that knew each other,
that had a good toy among them, funded by grants from the
government - the National Science Foundation, which is here's a big pile of money, do something interesting with it and
if you piss off the Republicans, that's okay too. That's the general model. These people built a network mostly to communicate with each other because it was fun, but also with the idea
that it might take off some day. And sure enough, it did. And
one of the problems, the "whip-saw" problems that came about
as this network took off, was that an informal way of making
decisions about how the network would work that required -
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or at least to work well - would do well to have everybody on
the same page, using the same protocols, hewing to the same
rules; that informal way got sorely tested.
One of the major ways in which it got tested with respect to
domain names was exactly in the area that Professor Geist discussed. There were a number of trademark holders who, coming late to this, saw that their names' dot com had already been
taken, in fact, sometimes by their competitor. Stanleykaplan.com was taken by Princeton Review. MCI.com was taken
by Sprint. I mean, stuff like this was going on, and they didn't
want to have to resort to expensive litigation to get it back, although in the first instance that's exactly what they did. So
you had problems like that.
You also had problems where people were registering these
names. Other people were making lots of money off it because
they had ended up in the position of collecting money for each
name and complaining; others complaining sorely that they
weren't getting a piece of the action either. And it turned out
there basically was one guy that could be the guy to say, "You
know what? "Let's create '.biz' and you, sir, can run it. Professor Schwartz will run '.biz.'" That guy's name was John Postel,
and it just seemed a little weird that a guy in California with a
beard and long hair and sandals could decide that Professor
Schwartz could run ".biz."
So things came to a head as certain cooperative agreements,
NSF-like fundings that had been at a year's-long basis were
running out right around the summer of 1998. And that's
when the U.S. government in the form of Ira Magaziner, fresh
off his success in health care.., came to the U.S. Department
of Commerce and said, "we're going to publish a policy paper on
this." A policy paper. Where does the Commerce Department
publish a policy paper? Of course, we publish our policy papers
in the Brooklyn Journal of InternationalLaw. Where does. Ira
Magaziner publish his? In the FederalRegister. So the Federal Register publishes a policy paper that says "Internet community, figure this out, and come back to us when you have."
That's what it said.
And it started a process. A process for which Tamar Frankel
was instrumental. She got a call from a former student of hers
in Washington D.C. The student said, "Tamar, you know a lot
about non-profit corporations and such. Why don't you come
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down to D.C. over the summer and help us run a conferene at
which interested stakeholders will be invited from the four corners of the earth to come and talk about this." Tamar said
"Fine, but what's a domain name?"
Well, she got up to speed on it. She convened this conference.
It was a wonderful conference. You went there and you asked
anybody there, "Are you here to participate?" "No, I'm just
here to watch. I want to see what happens." Not a single person was there to participate. But of course, with all the watchers there, they got together and they started talking. And what
was the ground rule that Tamar put down to them? She said,
"Let's just see if there are places around which we can get consensus. Let's come up with a list on the stuff we in this room
roughly agree upon as the founding principles of a new, nonprofit public interest organization that's going to manage these
things that the bearded guy in California doesn't want to do
any more." That was the ground rule. And that ground rule
was reflected in the documents that ultimately became the
founding documents of ICANN. That consensus was the name
of the game. We don't want to force anybody to do anything
because it's not easy to do. We're just going to rely on the good
will of everybody wanting this barn to go up to make sure that
it gets raised.
By the end of 1998, you had a consensus-based organization
of uncertain duration, with board members that had initially
been picked by the bearded guy in California, that had to figure
out how to perpetuate itself in a way that was legitimate and
fair, how to solve the trademark problem in particular that Ira
Magaziner's policy paper, among other things, said "you've got
to solve," and how to do that fairly, and how to start coming up
with ".biz" and figure out whether Professor Schwartz deserves
to run it.
Now, as ICANN took up that challenge, I think one thing it
meant was that we basically voted ourselves rich process-wise.
Under the current bylaws of ICANN, how does an idea actually
happen under the bylaws? A constituency comes up with it.
The constituency has a representative on the Names Council,
which discusses it and votes upon it. It then gets referred to
two sister councils that discuss it and bounce it back, at which
point it goes up to the board, which puts it out for public comment, at which point the public comment comes back and the
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board votes on it, at which point if anybody doesn't like it, they
can vote for or move that the board reconsider its decision, at
which point if they don't like the reconsideration they can have
an independent review panel decide to look at it, at which point
the independent review panel can say we don't like this so
much - board, you've got to vote on it again, at which point
the board votes on it again, and you have a policy. That's "voting ourselves rich" process-wise.
And of course, it was still born. That's what the bylaws say.
How does it really work? The board gets together, they take a
vote, people object, they say thank you for your objection and
they go on to the next policy thing. That's the reality that differed so much from a process that was basically a combination
of Pikers, the self-interested parties that either wanted to see
that things got slowed down because they liked the status quo
or got their own voice in exactly as Tamar describes, and what
you might call amateurs. I'm an amateur. I was in the midst
of it and, I don't know, independent review panel? Who could
be against independent review? Who's against accountability?
The only guy I remember that actually saw trouble here was
Fred Wertheimer, the guy that headed up Common Cause for a
while. Common Cause, right? Doesn't get much cleaner than
that. We told Fred Wertheimer that the one big demand that
had gotten through from outsiders was that ICANN needed to
have a membership that appointed the board. And Fred
Wertheimer shook his head and said, "Common Cause had a
membership for a while. We got rid of it pretty quickly." It
turns out you get a lot of -

what do you call them -

PTA

members, that show up and stack the meeting. What would it
take to stack this meeting and change whether there was consensus on what a ccTLD registry was? Not much. One Brooklyn law student throws a pizza party and invites everybody up
here. That's the end of the story for whatever they want this
group of people to accomplish. And you have the people that
were the heirs to John Postel, the technical community looking
at this and saying, "Is this the way to run the ocean liner?"
So that's the kind of stalemate again that we got. And the
at-large membership was . . . trying to allow anybody in the

world that wanted a vote for the ICANN board, for half of the
ICANN board to get that vote. In fact, the Markel Foundation,
I see Stephaan Verhulst is here, funded that to the tune of
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$200,000. There's their press release. Let me just read it to
you quickly: November 2, 1999, Markel Foundation Commits
More than $1 Million to Improve Internet Governance. ICANN
hates the word "Internet governance." It's just technical coordination of complicated things you don't need to know about,
including initiatives to make ICANN more publicly accountable. Markel's effortless design helps ensure that all users of
the Internet are aware of ICANN's rule and have a voice in its
decision-making.
So we have the election. And it turns out that the Japanese
and the Chinese get into this kind of tit-for-tat as to who can
register more so that they can have their guy instead of the
other. So they throw pizza parties across China, and the Chinese win. October 11, 2000, here's the press release from
Markel. ICANN Elections: An Important Moment for Internet
Governance. Subtitle: "Despite flaws, election to select five atlarge board members to ICANN an important experiment in
the process to make governance more accountable. Election
study will help determine whether elections are viable." Indeed, Markel funds a study to the tune of $432,000 for an atlarge study committee to decide how the elections went. The
at-large study committee comes back and says they didn't go so
well. There was this Japanese-Chinese thing and the pizza
parties and all that. But we have another draft, 2.0. And just
like Microsoft, by 3.0 we are going to be killer.
So they have their proposal floating around to try to make it
work and answer ...the question asked ...by a policy paper
in the Federal Register, by the U.S. Department of Commerce
and Ira Magaziner - in latter days the kind of question asked
by Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg: "Are we as a community
capable of governing ours?" That's the question of ICANN.
That's what makes ICANN interesting to me.
The answer that Stuart Lynn, the President just gave back,
that Jonathan Weinberg is talking about, that Tamar was talking about is "uh-uh." So far, it's been a complete bust because
we've tried to vote ourselves rich. We have these ponderous
processes nobody uses, and all the people that were supposed to
pitch in at the potluck showed up to eat but didn't bring a casserole. This is not a way to run a global organization.
And he has come up with an alternative that basically is the
board of trustees model, like an opera house. You have a board
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of trustees and it proceeds by right of kings. They choose their
successors. Nominated by governments, half of them; some of
them nominated by a nominating committee appointed by the
board of trustees and onward it goes. Now, that works for an
opera house, but as Tamar was quick to point out over that
Summer of 1998, an opera house just decides on what opera to
put on. It doesn't decide what opera Professor Schwartz can
put on. This is something that, as Weinberg is saying, "yes,
there is some power here."
So I need to wrap up. I want to leave with two questions to
maybe throw out to this panel to discuss in our remaining moments. Here's issue number one: We were presented by Professor Geist of basically a very broken system in terms of fairness
with the question of deciding whether bodacious X should be
switched over from one person to another. Now, I don't know
how important it is who gets bodacious whatever, but the system by its own terms, by his data, is clearly, manifestly broken.
If you could choose your own judge, and the defendant can't,
what would that mean? It's bizarre. And there's obvious fixes
that he's put forward. This is not rocket science.
So question number one is: Which ICANN do you guys trust
more to institute the fixes? The ICANN we have now, with all
the process on paper that everybody ignores. A membership
that's who can bring them more pizza and a board that God
knows where they came from - is that ICANN better suited to
fix it? Or the trustee model along the lines that Stuart Lynn
put out that says, "Look, we'll have the governments nominate
some people - somebody elected the governments, after all, at
least for the most part," and ... Which is the better model to
fix that very concrete problem?
The second question I want to leave the panel with is that
Stuart has this searing indictment of ICANN, and in a way it's
an indictment of all of us. 'It's an indictment of the amateurs
who came in and wanted to try to make an interesting new system work. It's an indictment of the Markel Foundation daring
to think that it could fund a global accountability regime that
would have broad-based public participation. I mean, the
thank you from ICANN to Markel is to say: "This isn't working. Thanks for the money, but, geez, what a silly idea it was
from the fact, noble though it may have been, that's the one
thing that he allows." He says ... let me just read one thing
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and then I'll let the question hang. "It is essential to state unambiguously what falls outside of ICANN's scope. The core
ICANN mission includes no mandate to innovate new institutions of global democracy nor to achieve mathematically equal
representation of all affected individuals and organizations, nor
to regulate content, nor to solve the problems of the digital divide, nor to embody some idealized and never-before-realized
model of process or procedure."
Our model is to make the Internet work. Give us our trustees. Let the government nominate them. Let the bearded
heirs to John Postel nominate the other half and we'll do our
job, and leave us alone. Just pay us three times more than the
$5 million a year we're requiring now just to attend congressional hearings and have meetings in Santiago, Akra, Yokahama, Los Angeles... where else?... Montevideo, yes, around
the world, for which people within 100 miles of each city can
say they had their shot at global governance. With that, I'll
leave the question and see who might want to take it on.
Thank you.
EDWARD JANGER: This has been an extraordinary panel
and I've hated to be the timekeeper. And in the interest of not
leaving the question hanging, what I propose to do - we have
about three minutes - is to let the panel either pick up Professor Zittrain's two questions, or if they can by consensus, decide
who goes next, say anything they want to in closing.
JONATHAN WEINBERG: I took three minutes over my assigned time initially so I figure I'm operating in deficit here.
That was the apology, which suggested I'm European at heart.
It's surely the case that one of the really notable things about
the ICANN processes is that they've been honored in the
breach, that the ICANN board and staff take actions without
going through the necessary processes. This suggests that
there's something wrong with the processes, although it also
suggests that the existence of those processes on paper can't
really be an obstacle to ICANN functioning since no one's paying attention to them anyway. It's hard to point to the independent review process as an ongoing problem for ICANN since
ICANN has refused to create an independent review panel that
would hear independent review claims. So while we need to try
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and figure out why this stuff hasn't happened .. . this is in
many respects a system that hasn't been tried, and we need to
focus on that.
I will take issue with the notion of the at-large membership
as a failure. I think if you read the study Stefaan funded, it'll
say that the elections actually worked out pretty well. I would
argue that they worked out pretty well. The Japanese one, by
the way, or at least Masanobo Kato from Fujitsu is the Asian
region's at-large representative.
TAMAR FRANKEL: I'd like to say a number of things.
Number one, whatever you heard about, it won't work. We
don't need innovation, we need the opera house. That was said
in 1978. As a matter of fact, it was said to me. You're dreaming and, it won't happen. So this is not something new. It
happened before, before ICANN was established. It was said
before ICANN was established.
Number two, I plead guilty. I was one - I won't take all the
blame - but I was one of those who said "power, you are welcome, but there must be some accountability." But I never said
that the accountability meant to take everyone who had a domain name and give them a vote. It is fantastic to me. On the
contrary. I said, "When I go to Filene's and I don't like [something], I don't want to change the management. I go across the
street and I have five other stores." Exiting a market is very
cheap to me. Voice is tremendously expensive. And the voices
of millions of people is tremendously expensive, and I didn't
think that accountability meant only this type of vote. Besides,
I'm not sure that 5 million, 10 million or however many million
people can really make a board accountable. I thought, the
more people who are voting, the less accountability there's going to be.
So that was not the case. But there are methods by which
people who are in power can be accountable. If you look at the
Securities and Exchange Commission, thdy are not elected, but
boy, they are accountable, and there are many other mechanisms, and I won't bore you with them. But I could give you
quite a few. So what was done here to some extent was to
throw the baby with the bath water, and because you couldn't,
you couldn't have elections you don't have accountability altogether. And that I think is a mistake, and I'm sorry I didn't
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have the time to talk about that. But I think ICANN must be
accountable.
Now, if you look at those who finance operas, you will find
that they sit on the board and they decide what the opera
should be. And to some extent, you could say if the board contains all the people who have a real stake in the system and it's
broad enough, you may have a fairly effective accountability,
plus, and here is a must, plus good, good accountants. Yes?
My fear of this proposal is that ... if you broaden the base
and you have the trustees and they don't agree, you will have.
• . inside what you had outside, and you will not have the kind
of consensus that will really be representative of those of us
who are passive, who are outside. And I'm hoping that that is
where my "contestable markets" do enter to some extent. I'm
hoping that there will be enough people outside or enough institutions outside who will say, "Hey, now you will tell us that
you've failed and therefore you want to try something else.
We'll tell you that you've failed and therefore you're out." That
will be the kind of control that may put accountability in place.
EDWARD JANGER: And now for a very brief last word, Professor Geist.
MICHAEL GEIST: Three quick things. First, the issue of
letting the stakeholders get involved. As long as the stakeholders decide, the system will be fine. I want to make sure
everybody here knows, whether you hum or not, that every single person in this room has a stake. This is not just about the
money that Network Solutions makes or other registrars make
or the rights of trademark holders. We're talking about people's rights to be able to say what they want on the Internet
through domain names that people will see. We're talking
about the ability to participate. Everyone has a stake in this.
That's one of the reasons why an election is essential, and it's
one of the reasons why the election envisioned half of the
board, or the initial system envisioned half of the board being
elected. Jonathan talked about a system where half the board
will be elected. Half the board wasn't elected and still hasn't
been elected. Five of the seats were elected. The rest were left
for another day, which apparently may now never come to pass.
It was part of an experiment. We've got an experiment that's
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halfway concluded and was never fully realized whatsoever,
notwithstanding what anyone might say.
Finally, Stuart Lynn talks about the problems and too much
process of getting things done. It's a bit of a straw man. Where
are the issues that this process has held up? Where are the
real problems that somehow aren't being solved on a regular
basis? There is staff solving for us all - the kinds of issues
that I don't think the users are getting their input. But the
extent to which there are significant issues that ICANN can't
operate unless we fundamentally do away with consensus, I
don't think we've seen them at all. Someone has to say: "Either
show us the problem, show me the money or stick with what we
have and at least see this experiment through."
EDWARD JANGER: Well, with that, we will adjourn.

